Why have takeover defences become so rare in the UK?

This week’s FT Big Read from John Gapper covered the steady disappearance of companies from the UK stock market, many into private ownership.

It’s a familiar story, and much has been written about the causes: UK equity fund outflows, the declining appetite of domestic pension funds for UK equities, a perceived lack of corporate ambition and the attractions of private ownership.

But there’s another aspect that doesn’t get as much attention – why do we see so few successful takeover defences where the company ultimately remains independent?

There are obvious caveats. An initial offer may be successfully defended, only for a higher offer to emerge that the Board feels able to recommend. Equally, we don’t see the approaches that are rejected in private. There are also some notable exceptions, perhaps the most famous in the UK being AstraZeneca’s defence against Pfizer, albeit that was more than a decade ago.

Nevertheless, Boards can find themselves in the invidious position of facing an offer that represents a substantial premium to the prevailing share price, sometimes well beyond what might once have been considered sufficient to secure a recommendation, while still falling short of what they believe the business is worth over the longer term.

In those circumstances, the incentives to mount a robust defence are not always particularly compelling.

  • For Boards, rejecting an offer establishes a very public valuation benchmark against which future performance will be judged, potentially for years, and where exceeding that benchmark is partly dependent on factors outside their control.
  • For shareholders, a significant premium today may be more attractive than the uncertain prospect of greater value in three or five years, not least given the aforementioned fund outflows.
  • For executives, private ownership can offer the attraction of pursuing a long-term strategy without the pressures and scrutiny of public markets, particularly where difficult decisions involving significant upfront costs need to be made.

None of this means that accepting an offer is necessarily the wrong decision. A substantial premium, and certainty of value today, can be a very good outcome for shareholders and the company’s wider stakeholders.

That aside, there is still a debate to be had about whether the balance of pressures facing Boards makes it harder to defend an offer than to recommend one. There is no easy answer, but companies should feel they have the backing and the tools to defend an offer when they genuinely believe it undervalues the long-term prospects of the business.

That preparation needs to start long before an offer emerges: a robust Board debate about intrinsic value, the strategy underpinning it and how long it will take to deliver; a clear understanding of shareholder views; an investment case that is well-articulated and understood by the market, with regular evidence of delivery; consideration of actions that might strengthen the business but could appear reactive if taken in response to an approach; and an internal and advisory team with clear responsibilities and aligned interests.

None of this guarantees success, but it should give Boards a stronger platform to make the case for independence when they believe it is the right course.

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